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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has established three methods of analysis (or 
rules) for antitrust cases: the Per Se analysis,1 the Quick Look analysis,2 
and the Rule of Reason analysis.3   Each analysis comes with different 
inquiries.  The Per Se analysis focuses on the actions of the defendant.  
The quick look analysis focuses on the positive and the negative effects 
of the defendant’s actions and then balances these effects.  The Rule of 
Reason analysis investigates an array of elements, which includes the 
plaintiff’s economic injuries, the market power, and the actions of the 
defendant, amongst others. 
The Supreme Court made clear in Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Medical Society4 that trial courts must select the appropriate mode of 
analysis at the beginning of the trial.  The Supreme Court also affirmed 
the rule of reason as the default of the three modes of analysis.5   Beyond 
offering these two clarifications, the Court provided little guidance on 
how to choose the appropriate rule, yet this choice may make or break a 
case. 
Counter-intuitively, courts must choose the rule at the beginning of 
a trial, rather than during the course of the trial or prior to presenting the 
                                                                                                             
 1 “Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect 
of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in 
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.” United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). 
 2 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) 
[hereinafter BMI] and its progeny created the quick look analysis, affirmed in California 
Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).  See Section II infra. 
 3 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 4 457 U.S. 332, 337 n.3 (1982). 
 5 “The rule of reason “presumptively applies . . . under which antitrust plaintiffs 
must demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and 
anticompetitive before it will be found unlawful.”  Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 
(2006). 
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case to the jury.6  This means that courts decide how to analyze antitrust 
cases based only upon the facts of the case as pled in the complaint and 
answer. Selecting the rule affects the presumptions; these presumptions 
affect which party carries the burden of proof.   The rule also affects 
whether the case can be sent to a jury.  While juries can decide per se 
and rule of reason cases, they cannot determine quick look cases.7 
The question of whether cases decided under quick look can go to 
the jury came before the Third Circuit in Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP 
Tour Inc.8  The Third Circuit wrote that quick look cannot not be sent to 
the jury, basing its decision upon the American Bar Association model 
jury instructions.9   The Third Circuit relied upon a misguided source and 
failed to follow the subtle guidance the Supreme Court provided in 
California Dental Ass’n v. FTC.10 
This paper disagrees with the decision of the Third Circuit and 
makes a two-part argument that trial courts can submit quick look cases 
to a jury.  First, I examine the quick look jurisprudence and how lower 
courts have applied all three methods of analysis.  Part I explains that 
courts have been reluctant to let quick look go to the jury because juries 
are not sophisticated enough to handle quick look and because they 
reason that quick look analysis amounts to a summary judgment.11  This 
section also argues that with the fading application of per se, quick look 
will become more important in the future. 
In Part II, I argue that quick look ought to go to the jury because, 
according to California Dental Ass’n, the three methods of analysis are 
                                                                                                             
 6 “The selection of the proper mode of antitrust analysis is a question of law, which 
[courts] review de novo.” Cal., ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). 
 7 See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 
701 (1962) (discussing the type of evidence a jury can balance in per se cases).  In 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) and Continental TV, Inc. 
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Supreme Court affirmed rule of reason 
cases sent to the jury.  See Section III. A & B infra. 
 8 610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 9 Id. at 833. 
 10 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 11 I would argue that quick look is not limited to summary judgment because it would 
seem redundant to have both summary judgment and quick look in Antitrust law.  They 
serve different functions and as such abide by different standards and rules.  See 
generally Edward Brunet, Antitrust Summary Judgment and the Quick Look Approach, 
62 SMU L. REV. 493 (2009) (detailing the relationship between quick look and summary 
judgment). 
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part of the same inquiry.12  Since the three methods of analysis live along 
a spectrum of analyses and since per se and rule of reason already go to 
the jury, quick look should also go to the jury. 
In Part III, I argue that quick look ought to go to the jury because 
the Supreme Court decision creates an observer standard.13  The observer 
standard sparks confusion about whether quick look involves questions 
of fact, which the jury can weigh, or questions of law reserved for the 
court.  To understand this observer standard, this section looks at other, 
better-defined observer standards.  The Court employs observer 
standards in two other contexts, the Establishment Clause and Patent 
contexts.   In both of these contexts, the Supreme Court defines observer 
in a way that implicates questions of fact (and juries) to different 
degrees.   Since other comparable observer standards go to the jury, I 
argue that the California Dental Ass’n quick look observer standard must 
involve juries as well. 
A trial court’s rule selection has resounding impact upon antitrust 
cases whether the parties litigate or settle their case.  Whether the case 
can be sent to the jury, however, should not be impacted by the rule 
selection.  This paper questions why the Supreme Court would create an 
antitrust specific summary judgment, discusses how inconsistent it would 
be for quick look not to go to the jury, and objects to the notion that 
defendants could avoid jury trials simply by requesting quick look. 
II. QUICK LOOK: A BRIEF HISTORY 
The Supreme Court created rule of reason, then per se, and finally 
quick look, almost as gap filler.14  This chronology supports that the 
Court created quick look to address a need: the Court wanted the 
                                                                                                             
 12 This paper argues that since per se and rule of reason are submitted to the jury, 
quick look should be as well, without weighing in on the debate of whether courts should 
submit to a jury per se and rule of reason questions. 
 13 “In California Dental, [the Supreme Court] held (unanimously) that abandonment 
of the ‘rule of reason’ in favor of presumptive rules (or a ‘quick-look’ approach) is 
appropriate only where ‘an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of 
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an 
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 
2237 (2013) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 770). 
 14 C. Paul Rogers III, The Incredible Shrinking Antitrust Law and the Antitrust Gap, 
52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 67 n.255 (2013) (arguing that the expending rule of reason has 
created more gap uncertainty, which quick look has failed to reduce).  For a better 
understanding of the quick look, see Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and 
Characterization: the Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2012) 
(discussing the evolution of the application of the rule of reason and the rise of quick 
look). 
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flexibility of rule of reason without losing the efficiencies of per se and 
hence created quick look.  Antitrust literature, however, does not dwell 
much on quick look because it is the victim of a vicious circle: courts do 
not apply quick look as often as per se or rule of reason because 
plaintiffs do not request quick look as often as per se and rule of reason; 
plaintiffs do not request the application of quick look because plaintiffs 
cannot well predict the outcome of its applications; plaintiffs cannot well 
predict this outcome because neither courts nor plaintiffs understand 
quick look as well as per se and rule of reason; courts do not understand 
quick look as well because they do not apply quick look as frequently as 
per se and rule of reason.15  This vicious circle will likely endure because 
most plaintiffs are not repeat players and have little to gain from helping 
a court understand quick look; hence, cases applying quick look are rare.  
This section looks at the history of the quick look analysis first by 
discussing three necessary stages that lead to the birth of quick look: the 
Sherman Act;16 the births of rule of reasons; and the birth of per se.  This 
section then explains the birth of quick look and closes by diving into 
more detail into some of its progeny. 
A. The Road and Stops to Quick Look 
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.  The Act uses 
broad common law language and uses terms such as “in restraint of 
trade” 17  or “attempt to monopolize” 18  that the courts must interpret.  
Courts have interpreted these terms over time. 
In 1911, the Supreme Court established the Rule of Reason in 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 19  which made illegal any 
“unreasonable restraint of trade.” 20   “Under this rule, the factfinder 
                                                                                                             
 15 Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1413 (2009). 
 16 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
 17 Id. at § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
 18 Id. at § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony.”). 
 19 “[T]he criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether violations of the section have been committed, is the rule of reason guided by the 
established law and by the plain duty to enforce the prohibitions of the act and thus the 
public policy which its restrictions were obviously enacted to subserve.” 221 U.S. 1, 62 
(1911). 
 20 Id. at 87–88. 
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weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive 
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on 
competition.”21  This rule is the default method of analysis.22 
In Standard Oil Co., the defendants were accused of conspiring to 
monopolize the oil market. 23   The participants in the conspiracy 
combined through agreements, stock purchase, and coercion to control 
almost all the oil refineries in the Cleveland area.24  Judicial history 
ironically notes, much like Justice Harland did in his dissent, that 
Standard Oil Co. involved restraints of trade, such as price fixing, that do 
not require rule of reason, but instead require per se.25 
The evolution to the modern rule of reason took many years.  The 
modern rule of reason commands a case-specific complex market 
analysis26 that requires the plaintiff to identify the relevant geographical 
market27 and the relevant product market, which parties can establish in a 
number of ways.28 
As early as 1927, the Supreme Court prohibited horizontal price 
fixing agreements as unreasonable regardless of the pricing 
reasonableness.  In the Court’s view, price fixing had obvious adverse 
effects on consumers: “naked” horizontal price fixing raises prices, 
decreases output, and harms consumers.29  In 1940, the Supreme Court in 
                                                                                                             
 21 Cont. TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
 22 Bus. Elects. Corp. v. Sharp Elects. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723–24 (1988). 
 23 Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 31. 
 24 Id. at 32–33. 
 25 Id. at 82–83. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See United States. v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963) (noting 
that the “area of effective competition in the known line of commerce must be charted by 
careful selection of the market area in which the seller operates, and to which the 
purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.”) (citations omitted). 
 28 See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956) 
(“Determination of the competitive market for commodities depends on how different 
from one another are the offered commodities in character or use, how far buyers will go 
to substitute one commodity for another.”). This case is often referred as the cellophane 
fallacy.  The Supreme Court used cross-price elasticity to determine whether two 
products are substitutes, whether the product manufacturer has market power and thus 
whether he can raise prices without affecting quantity as substantially.  The Court failed 
to differentiate between capacity to increase prices further and capacity to increase prices: 
du Pont in this case may have already used its market power and explaining why it could 
not further increase prices; but the Court interpreted the high cross-elasticity to signify 
that it never had power to increase prices.  For further discussion of this issue, see 
generally Robert Harris and Thomas Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated 
Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
 29 See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (holding 
unlawful an agreement between manufacturers that represented 82% of the market to fix 
prices regardless of the reasonableness of the price fixing). 
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United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.30 established the per se rule for 
price fixing agreements.  “[P]rice-fixing agreements are unlawful per se 
under the Sherman Act and . . . no showing of so-called competitive 
abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or 
alleviate may be interposed as a defense.”31   In other words, per se 
condemns the actions of price fixing regardless of whether it succeeds.  
Judicial history ironically notes again that Socony-Vacuum dealt with 
quantity restriction, not price fixing.32   Numerous other kinds of conduct 
that have similar effects upon prices or quantities have been and remain 
per se unlawful.33 
In per se cases, the plaintiff carries the burden of proof to show that 
the defendant’s restraint falls within the category of per se restraints. 
Once the plaintiff satisfies its burden of proof, “the per se rule create[s] 
an irrebuttable presumption of unreasonableness,”34 not created by rule 
of reason. 
Per se finds support in judicial and business efficiencies.  Justice 
Black explained that the benefits of per se are three-fold: per se warns 
businessmen of the unlawfulness of particular practices, avoids 
administrative costs of repetitively proving the anticompetitive effects of 
the same practices, and helps judges treat similar conduct in the same 
way.35 
Over twenty years later, Justice Stevens lamented the degree to 
which courts apply per se and explained that “[f]or the sake of business 
certainty and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of 
some agreements that a fullblown inquiry might have proved to be 
reasonable.”36   As time went on, the cost of finding guilty innocent 
venturers (false positives) outweighed the benefits of judicial consistency 
and efficiency: broad application of per se did not seem worth these 
benefits any more and, thus, slowly lost support. 
                                                                                                             
 30 310 U. S. 150 (1940). 
 31 Id. at 218. 
 32 Id. at 223–24 (holding that an agreement between horizontal competitors to buy 
excess supplies from non-participating manufacturers was per se unlawful because the 
agreement aimed at removing supply from the market in order to increase prices). 
 33 For instance, horizontal agreements to allocate markets or customers remain per se 
unlawful because it has the same effect of decreasing competition, and raising prices.  See 
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Palmer v. BRG of 
Georgia, 498 U.S. 46 (1990). 
 34 Andrew I. Gavil, Burden of Proof in U.S. Antitrust Law, 1 ISSUES IN COMP. L. & 
POL. 125, 138 (2008). 
 35 N. Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 36 Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982). 
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The waves were changing and the Court was ready to ride them.37  
These waves lead the Court to create a new analysis that combines 
elements from per se and rule of reason and addresses their respective 
drawbacks.  Quick look was this new analysis, decreasing the number of 
false positives associated with per se and also decreasing the judicial 
inefficiencies associated with rule of reason. 
B. BMI, NCAA, and California Dental: Moving Slowly But Surely 
The Per Se rule and Rule of Reason form a dichotomy of rules: 
antitrust cases are analyzed under either of these rules.  However, 
discontent grew with this dichotomy.  Quick Look soon appeared as the 
gap filler analysis that bridged the two already-established analyses.  The 
Court did not create this quick look bridge in one case but instead slowly 
created it without giving it a name for a long time.  This section focuses 
on the slow birth of quick look. 
During the same era when Justice Stevens expressed his discontent 
with per se, the Supreme Court was already moving away from per se 
and the dichotomy of rules.  The first nail in the coffin of this dichotomy 
came in National Society of Professional Engineers v. U.S.38  In this 
case, engineers who were members of the National Society of 
Professional Engineers were prohibited from submitting any price 
information to customers. 39   The association asserted that price 
competition affected “the public health, safety, and welfare” because 
engineers will use “inefficient and unnecessarily expensive structures 
and methods of construction” in order to cut costs and be more 
competitive.40  The Court rejected this justification, however, ruling the 
restriction unreasonable41 and determining that per se and rule of reason 
                                                                                                             
 37 In Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, Daniel A. Crane discussed the 
movement from rules embodied by per se illegal and per se legal activity and toward 
standards embodied by the rule of reason. 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007).  In 
Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason, 
Alan J. Meese discussed the Court’s move away from the per se rule and toward the rule 
of reason with the end of the Populist era.  Meese argued that quick look was a byproduct 
of this movement and should be abandoned as over inclusive and leading to errors.  68 
ANTITRUST L.J. 461 (2000).  Prof. Nachbar argued that “[i]f the evolution of antitrust 
analysis—the gradual abandonment of per se approaches to virtually every restraint—
teaches anything, it is that there are very few restraints that will harm efficiency with the 
constancy necessary to justify their absolute prohibition in all circumstances.”  The 
Antitrust Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 57, 113 (2013). 
 38 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 39 Id. at 683. 
 40 Id. at 685. 
 41 Id. at 696. 
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were complementary. 42   More importantly, the holding in National 
Society of Professional Engineers dimmed the line between the two 
rules: the Court affirmed the lower court’s finding that the restriction was 
per se illegal and did not require an in-depth market analysis;43 yet, the 
Court allowed the defendant to offer some justifications.  But those 
justifications were not quite pro-competitive in nature, which courts 
usually overlook in per se analysis.44 
The following year, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc.45 [BMI] put a second nail in the dichotomy’s 
coffin.  In BMI, the defendants sold music recordings through blanket 
license agreements.46  Even though these blanket licenses were naked 
price fixing agreements, the Court found that the agreements were 
necessary for the license provider to offer this new product and achieve 
the associated efficiencies.47  Thus, the Court allowed some efficiency 
justifications in its analysis of a horizontal price fixing agreement 
because “the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts; it is, to some 
extent, a different product.”48  In other words, Columbia Broadcasting 
System created a new product, the bundle license, that cannot exist 
without a horizontal agreement on prices.  Since BMI, the question of 
whether joint-venturers must horizontally agree on price to create a new 
product has become central when courts investigate cooperation issues.49 
A few years later, in National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of 
Regents of Univ. of Okla.,50 the Court further addressed this cooperation-
necessity issue.  In this case, an association of colleges horizontally 
agreed to form a football league.51  This association also negotiated the 
league’s broadcasting rights.52  The Court recognized that competitors, 
the schools, needed to cooperate in order to create a new product: the 
                                                                                                             
 42 Id. at 692. 
 43 “While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required to 
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement. It operates as an 
absolute ban on competitive bidding, applying with equal force to both complicated and 
simple projects and to both inexperienced and sophisticated customers.”  Id. 
 44 The Court heard but yet rejected the Society’s argument with regard to safety 
under the rule of reason.  Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695. 
 45 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 46 Id. at 5. 
 47 Id. at 21. 
 48 Id. at 21–22. 
 49 See e.g. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 3 (2006) (holding that price agreement 
of a lawful joint venture does not violate the Sherman Act). 
 50 468 U.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter NCAA]. 
 51 Id. at 94. 
 52 Id. at 95. 
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college football league.  League participants must agree on the size of the 
field, the number of players, and so forth.53  Competitors, however, did 
not need to agree on price and output to create that league.54 
The Court asserted that “[t]his naked restraint on price and output 
requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed 
market analysis.” 55   More importantly, the Court let the association 
present its pro-competitive justifications for its broadcasting agreement.56  
But, the Court found that this agreement constituted a blanket price 
agreement that was not necessary (and only ancillary) to create the new 
product. 57  As a result, the Court struck down the price fixing portion of 
the cooperation. 
In BMI and NCAA, the Court faced horizontal price fixing 
agreements.  Instead of ruling them per se invalid, the Court looked at 
the actions of the defendants and also considered pro-competitive 
justifications for these actions.  This double inquiry subtly marked a 
movement away from per se on price fixing issues but did not quite 
involve a rule of reason market inquiry. 
The Supreme Court put the final nail in the proverbial coffin of per 
se-rule of reason dichotomy in California Dental Ass’n v. FTC.58  The 
Court recognized the existence of a third mode of analysis and coined it 
Quick Look; nonetheless, the Court found that the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) erred in using quick look.59  In this case, the FTC 
investigated an association of dentists, the California Dental Association 
(CDA).  The dental association had multiple purposes, from providing 
insurance to lobbying on behalf of its members.60  The association also 
required that its members not advertise using misleading or deceiving 
information.61  The FTC “brought a complaint against the CDA, alleging 
that it applied its guidelines so as to restrict truthful, nondeceptive 
advertising, and so violated § 5 of the FTC Act,”62 which prohibited 
members from advertising about prices and quality; 63  and hence 
amounted to a “‘naked’ restraint on price competition itself.”64 
                                                                                                             
 53 Id. at 101. 
 54 Id. at 110. 
 55 Id. 
 56 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114. 
 57 Id. at 114–15. 
 58 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 59 Id. at 765. 
 60 Id. at 767. 
 61 Id. at 768. 
 62 Id. at 762. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 763. 
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During the administrative proceedings, an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) found a violation of § 5 of the FTC Act because the 
limitation on advertising harmed dentists and consumers.  The ALJ, 
however, came to this conclusion without requiring an inquiry into 
market powers under In re Massachusetts Board of Registration in 
Optometry.65  The Commission affirmed this ruling and affirmed that the 
quick look analysis was appropriate.66   On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that per se analysis would have been inappropriate, but 
approved of the quick look analysis because the association’s restrictions 
amounted to a naked restraint on price.67 
The Supreme Court reversed.  In California Dental Ass’n, the Court 
found that quick look was inappropriate for analyzing restraints on 
advertising because this case “fail[ed] to present a situation in which the 
likelihood of anticompetitive effects [was] comparably obvious.”68  The 
Court ruled that the rule of reason analysis was the appropriate analysis 
for this restrictive agreement because the effect on price is less obvious 
than naked price fixing and requires a more in depth examination.69  The 
Court stated that a quick look analysis was appropriate “when the great 
likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.”70  The 
Court cited three such cases in which it applied an analysis close to a 
quick look analysis: National Society of Professional Engineers; 71 
NCAA;72 and FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.73 
The Court articulated two important points.  First, the Court 
recognized that the “categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are 
less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend 
to make them appear.”74  The Court described a spectrum75 where quick 
look falls between the two extremes (per se and rule of reason).  In other 
                                                                                                             
 65 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988). 
 66 Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 764. 
 67 Id. at 763. 
 68 Id. at 771. 
 69 Id. at 779. 
 70 Id. at 770. 
 71 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (holding that “no elaborate industry analysis is required 
to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of” horizontal conspiracy to refuse to 
discuss prices with consumers). 
 72 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (holding that an association of colleges that coordinated to 
create a new football league conspired to restrict output when it restricted “the ability of 
member institutions to respond to consumer preference” when the association restricted 
their ability to televise games individually). 
 73 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (holding that an horizontal agreement to withhold a 
service was unlawful without requiring further inquiry into market analysis). 
 74 Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 771. 
 75 Id. at 780. 
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words, the Court interpreted the three choices as choosing one analysis 
along a single and continuous spectrum of analyses.  In the Court’s view, 
this choice depends on the investigated restraint. 
Second, the Court explained that the quick look analysis is 
appropriate when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of 
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have 
an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”76  But, the Court 
left the identity of this observer open to interpretation. 
Recently, the Court referred to quick look in Texaco, Inc. v. 
Dagher,77 and in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. et al.78  In Dagher, the Court 
limited per se and quick look further, finding that these two analyses 
were inappropriate when addressing pricing decisions of a lawful joint 
venture.79 
In Actavis, Inc., the FTC brought a case against the participants of 
reverse payment settlements because the FTC wanted these settlements 
to be reviewed under antitrust laws.80  Reverse settlements occur when a 
patent holder settles with an alleged infringer who receives a substantial 
settlement payment in exchange for agreeing not to enter the market for 
an agreed-upon period.81  In its decision, the Supreme Court refused to 
apply quick look to reverse settlements because the anticompetitive 
effects of reverse payments depend on a number of factors such as the 
size of the payment and the litigation costs.82 
From these Supreme Court decisions, courts must decide when to 
apply quick look.  The next section addresses the situations where 
plaintiffs requested quick look and it describes how courts applied it.  As 
the next section evidences, courts often refuse to apply quick look and 
quick look remains the territory of the FTC. 
C. Since California Dental, Precedents Remain Far and Few With No 
Consensus: Quick Look A Modified Per Se or A Truncated Rule of 
Reason? 
Around the same time that the Supreme Court accepted the 
possibility of a quick look analysis, political changes pushed the Federal 
                                                                                                             
 76 Id. at 779. 
 77 547 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 78 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) 
 79 Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7 n.3. 
 80 See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2227. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 2237 (affirming that because of the complexity of reverse payment 
settlement agreements, “he FTC must prove its case as in other rule-of-reason cases”). 
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Trade Commission toward the same inquiry.83  Lower courts, however, 
simultaneously struggled with quick look.  As this section explains, these 
courts reserve quick look for anticompetitive behaviors that satisfy two 
requirements.  First, courts reserve quick look for cases involving 
anticompetitive behaviors for which they have accumulated some 
judicial experience.  This is because courts must rely on their experience 
and precedents to employ quick look.  Second, courts reserve quick look 
for cases that involve anticompetitive behaviors that have the same 
effects as per se, but are not per se on their face.  Rather, these cases may 
have pro-competitive justifications because of the unique market 
conditions, which demand that courts compare the advantages and 
disadvantages of the restraint. 
Lower courts have reserved quick look for behavior with which 
they already have extensive experience.84  In this respect, quick look 
resembles per se since a “per se rule is appropriate only after courts have 
had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue, and only 
if they can predict with confidence that the restraint would be invalidated 
in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason.”85 
Similarly, courts apply quick look only if they have the required 
experience.  For instance, the Ninth Circuit ruled in California, ex rel. 
Harris v. Safeway, Inc.86 that the case could not be decided under quick 
look because prior judicial experience does not allow courts to resolve 
the issue under per se or quick look analysis.87 
California, ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc. et al 88  involved a 
horizontal agreement amongst competitors to exercise their buying 
power, referred to as monopsony or oligopoly power.  The Ninth Circuit 
initially found that a horizontal profit sharing agreement among grocery 
store competitors was unlawful after “apply[ing] a per se-plus or a quick 
                                                                                                             
 83 “The power of appointment (and removal), we want to stress, is the most potent 
means a president has to create a responsive bureaucracy. This is illustrated by the 
Reagan administration’s careful choice of officials whose policy perspectives coincided 
with those of the president and who were willing to act accordingly.”  B. Dan Wood and 
James E. Anderson, The Politics of U.S. Antitrust Regulation, 37 AM. J. OF POL. SCIENCE 
1, 8 (1993) (citation omitted). 
 84 “The object is to see whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or 
necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a 
restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous 
one.”  Cal. Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999). 
 85 Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (U.S. 2007) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 86 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 87 Id. at 1139. 
 88 615 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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look-minus analysis.”89  However, after a rehearing en banc, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed90 and ruled that the “quick look-minus analysis” was not 
appropriate because prior judicial experience does not allow the court to 
resolve the issue under per se or quick look analysis.91  The court thus 
found that the defendants established sufficient doubt to raise the 
analysis to a full-blown rule of reason analysis: co-conspirators still have 
an interest in competing to retain current consumers or gain future 
consumers because the pooling agreement is short-lived and limited to 
15% share of the grocery market. 92 
Next, courts have limited the application of quick look to practices 
with effects similar to the effects of horizontal territorial division and 
price fixing.  Courts usually investigate horizontal territorial division and 
price fixing under per se, but investigate other anticompetitive behaviors 
with similar effects under quick look.  The anticompetitive behavior may 
present a factor or context that commands further analysis. 
The Supreme Court reserves per se analysis for restraints that 
“always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease 
output.”93  Courts seemingly reserve the quick look for the same types of 
cases and “have applied the quick look doctrine to business activities that 
are so plainly anticompetitive that courts need undertake only a cursory 
examination before imposing antitrust liability.”94 
Courts has used quick look to review cases involving horizontal 
conspiracies to restrain prices.  For instance, in Polygram Holding, Inc., 
v. FTC,95 the D.C. Circuit ruled that the FTC appropriately uses quick 
look when direct competitors conspire to restrain trade.96   In Polygram 
Holding, two record companies formed a joint venture to produce a new 
record.  As part of the joint venture, they agreed to temporarily suppress 
                                                                                                             
 89 Id. at 1180 (“[A] per se-plus or a quick look-minus analysis [is] a combined or 
mixed approach, somewhere between pure per se and pure quick look, along the lines 
suggested by the Court in California Dental Association.”). 
 90 Cal., ex rel. Harris, 651 F.3d at 1118. 
 91 Id. at 1139. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979). 
 94 Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7 n.3. 
 95 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 96 Crane, supra note 38, at 63.  Crane interprets Polygram to mean that “[r]ather than 
specifying ex ante rules of conduct, it allocates burdens of proof and persuasion within 
the litigation: Step One: The judge or agency considers whether the restraint obviously 
harms consumers; Step Two: If so, the judge or agency concludes that the practice does 
presumptively harm consumers, the defendant must come forward with a plausible and 
legally cognizable efficiency justification; Step Three: If the defendant does, the burden 
shifts back to the agency to address the justification, in one of two ways; and so forth.”  
Id. 
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promotion and price competition on two discs individually owned by 
each company because these individual records were competing with the 
companies’ joint venture. 97  The D.C. Circuit found that the companies 
had unlawfully horizontally conspired to restrain trade.98 
The Fifth Circuit, in North Texas Specialty Physicians v. FTC,99 
also found that quick look is appropriate in cases involving horizontal 
conspiracies to restrain price competition. 100   In this case, the FTC 
challenged a minimum fee agreement by an association of independent 
physicians where the independent and competing physicians associated 
to negotiate fees with insurance companies.101   The association polled its 
members, asking which minimum fee they were willing to accept, and 
used their responses “to calculate the mean, median, and mode of the 
minimum acceptable fees identified by its physicians.”102  Using quick 
look, the ALJ and the Commission found that this sort of polling 
represented horizontal price-fixing in violation of the FTC Act.103  The 
Fifth Circuit court affirmed, finding that the “practices [bore] a very 
close resemblance to horizontal price-fixing, generally deemed a per se 
violation.”104 
However, courts have not applied quick look to practices not 
involving horizontal agreements with the effects of a naked price or 
output fixing.105  Rather, courts demand a rule of reason analysis for 
horizontal agreements on non-price factors, such as industry standards.  
For instance, in Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.,106 the 
court dealt with a non-price horizontal restriction involving restraints on 
the permissible size of carry-on bags that passengers can fit through x-
ray machines at security gates.  The Fourth Circuit ruled that a cursory 
quick look analysis was inappropriate because a court may find that 
some of the pro-competitive justifications were not “illusory.”107  The 
court determined that quick look was inappropriate when “a challenged 
                                                                                                             
 97 Polygram, 416 F.3d at 32. 
 98 Id. at 38–39. 
 99 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 100 See id. 
 101 Id. at 353. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 365. 
 104 Id. at 362. 
 105 See, e.g., American Ad Mgmt. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 790 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that “the present case does not present the type of naked restraint on price or 
output that would justify a ‘quick look’” when a vertical market participant put price 
restriction on the downstream participants or agents) (citations omitted)). 
 106 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 107 Id. at 514. 
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restraint ‘might plausibly be thought to have a net pro-competitive effect, 
or possibly no effect at all on competition.’”108 
Courts also demand rule of reason analysis for vertical restraints.  
For instance, in Gordon v. Lewistown Hospital,109 the court dealt with a 
vertical restriction between a hospital and a physician.  The Third Circuit 
court ruled that quick look analysis was inappropriate when a hospital 
disciplines and revokes the privileges of one of its doctors because this 
revocation restrains the doctor’s practice. The court noted, however, that 
“even if the Conditions [of the disciplinary decision imposed on the 
defendant] were a restraint, they represent a nonprice vertical restraint 
between one hospital and one physician,” which it had previously 
reviewed under the traditional rule of reason.”110 
Finally, courts demand the rule of reason analysis for vertical and 
horizontal conspiracies.  For instance, in Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. 
Ford Motor Co.,111 the Eighth Circuit found that the quick look analysis 
was inappropriate where the manufacturer of a limousine input and an 
association of competing downstream limousine manufacturers 
attempted to prevent other downstream limousine manufacturers from 
advertising in trade journals if they did not comply or show compliance 
with certain safety standards.112 
The court found that the plaintiff presented enough evidence that 
the defendants collectively pressured to exclude the limousine 
manufacturer from advertising.113  Yet, because the court found that the 
defendants acted to enforce safety standards and  “[b]ecause the 
economic impact of safety standards is not immediately discernable, 
something more than a cursory per se analysis is required to determine 
whether the restraint was unreasonable.”114  The Eighth Circuit turned to 
its sister court, the Seventh Circuit, for guidance: because the 
anticompetitive effects were not immediately apparent, the rule of reason 
was appropriate to weigh whether safety concerns outweigh advertising 
restrictions.115 
Courts limit their application of quick look to cases involving 
horizontal agreement with the effects of a naked price fixing because 
they have extensive experience with these behaviors.  Courts may 
                                                                                                             
 108 Id. at 510. 
 109 423 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 110 Id. at 210. 
 111 363 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 112 Id. at 776. 
 113 Id. at 772. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 775–76. 
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usefully apply quick look to other types of cases, but remain reluctant to 
do so because quick look remains misunderstood.  A handful of other 
district court cases have touched upon quick look without applying it to 
the facts at hand.116   These district and circuit cases, however, show that 
only the FTC has applied a quick look analysis without being overturned 
on appeal.   This fact has led some commentators to believe that only the 
FTC can apply this type of analysis117 and that questions of quick look 
cannot reach the jury.  The following section shows that quick look can 
and should reach the jury because courts should approach all three 
analyses consistently. 
III. A SPECTRUM OF ANALYSES: QUICK LOOK IN TWO STEP 
In Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc.,118 the plaintiff alleged 
that the defendants conspired to restrain professional tennis players from 
playing in the plaintiff’s tournament because the defendants lowered the 
tournament ranking of the plaintiff and requested that these professional 
players attend more highly ranked tournaments.119  The Third Circuit 
held that, because the defendants offered pro-competitive justifications, 
the district court had properly instructed the jury “to analyze the alleged 
restraints under the rule of reason.”120  In dictum, the Third Circuit, citing 
                                                                                                             
 116 See, e.g., New Eng. Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. McKesson Corp., 573 F. 
Supp. 2d 431, 435 (D. Mass. 2008) (holding that the quick look analysis was not 
appropriate because the plaintiff failed to show “any anticompetitive effects at all, other 
than to say in conclusory fashion” of an agreement between non-competitors to state 
fraudulent drug prices); Madison Square Garden v. NHL, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81446, 
at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (holding that “quick look doctrine is inappropriate 
because the casual observer could not summarily conclude that this arrangement has an 
anticompetitive effect on customers” when the plaintiff who owns a team who participate 
complained of an horizontal agreement to restrain competition when the other league 
members agreed by majority to have their website hosted together); Med Alert 
Ambulance, Inc. v. Atlantic Health System, Inc. et al., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57083, at 
*27–28 n.9 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2007) (refusing to use a quick look analysis “[b]ecause 
Plaintiff can bring its claim under the rule of reason analysis, and further because the 
issue of the ‘quick look’ test was not challenged by Defendants); Toscano v. PGA Tour, 
Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that the quick look analysis 
was inappropriate because “a rudimentary understanding of the market demonstrates that 
the eligibility rules may have net procompetitive effects” when the plaintiff alleged that 
the PGA Tour’s action prevented the formation of a competing Senior league). 
 117 Stephen Calkins, California Dental Association: Not a Quick Look but not the Full 
Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495 (2000).  Some observers believe that this may be a mixed 
question of fact and law, which “may be hard to accomplish in a jury trial, but it plays to 
the Commission’s unique role as an expert adjudicator.”  Id. 
 118 610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 119 Id. at 826. 
 120 Id. at 833. 
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the A.B.A. model jury instructions, went on to explain that quick look 
could not be submitted to the jury anyway because “‘the application of 
the quick look analysis is a question of law to be determined by the 
court,’ and therefore the concept of ‘quick look’ has no application to 
jury inquiry.”121  However, the A.B.A. never justified this statement,122 
which has left the Third Circuit’s view subject to a great deal of 
criticism.123  In fact, the Third Circuit Court was too hasty in determining 
that quick look cannot go to the jury. 
This section investigates the first reason behind why quick look 
ought to go to the jury.  Specifically, the Supreme Court in California 
Dental Association stated that “[t]he truth is that our categories of 
analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ 
‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them appear.”124  Thus 
the three analyses lie along a continuous spectrum, sometimes referred to 
as a single inquiry.125   Furthermore, since per se and rule of reason 
analyses have gone to the jury, the third analysis within this same inquiry 
                                                                                                             
 121 Id. (quoting ABA Section of Antitrust Law, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL 
ANTITRUST CASES A-8 n.2 (2005)). 
 122 The ABA’s Model Jury Instructions provide in the pertinent part: 
These instructions do not include a separate instruction for the ‘quick look’ 
analysis because application of the quick look analysis is a question of law 
to be determined by the court.  If the court, based on its quick look analysis, 
determines that the defendant has come forward with a sound 
procompetitive justification for the alleged restraint, then the ‘court must 
proceed to weigh the overall reasonableness of the restraint using a full scale 
rule of reason analysis.’  United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (holding that district court should have engaged in full rule of 
reason analysis because quick look showed that defendant had sound pro-
competitive justification for the alleged restraint); see also Cal. Dental 
Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999) (full rule of reason analysis was 
required where challenged restraint ‘might plausibly be thought to have a 
net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on competition’).  For 
an overview of the situations in which quick look analysis should be applied 
and the factors that should be assessed, see ABA Section of Antitrust law, 1 
Antitrust Law Development 62-65 (5th ed. 2002).  See also Cal. Dental, 526 
U.S. at 769–71, 779–80; Viazis v. American Ass’n of Orthodontists, 314 
F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 2002); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 
277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002); Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 699; Chicago Prof’l 
Sports, Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992). 
ABA Section of Antitrust Law, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES 
A-8-A-9 n.2 (2005). 
 123 See Gavil, supra note 17, at 779 n.223 (“The Model Jury Instructions misread the 
cases it cites in support of this bold proposition, which was uncritically embraced in 
Deutscher Tennis Bund.”). 
 124 Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 779. 
 125 Realcomp II, Ltd, v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 826 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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must go the jury for consistency reasons, in the absence of any other 
indication from the Supreme Court. 
A. Per Se Rule Goes to the Jury and Quick Look Must Follow 
When trial courts investigate antitrust cases under per se, the courts 
involve the juries in a number of ways.  Under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, a jury must decide whether a horizontal cartel exists in order to find 
for the plaintiff. 126   For example, litigants centered Section 1 cases 
around cartel existence issues in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.127 
and the Supreme Court found that the lower court correctly submitted the 
question of whether an agreement existed to the jury.128   The Court 
agreed that, because a conspiracy to fix prices is a per se violation, 
whether the prices is reasonable is not an issue or a defense.129 
Some courts, like the Eleventh Circuit, have fashioned pattern jury 
instructions for civil cases. 130   Among these pattern instructions, the 
Eleventh Circuit includes pattern jury instructions on per se 
investigations.131  Similarly, the A.B.A. model jury instructions, upon 
which the Third Circuit bases its dictum, contain a section on per se 
offenses.132  Thus, cases that courts decide under per se still go to the 
jury to determine whether the elements of the case (such as price 
collusion) are present. 
Finally, quick look mirrors per se in some aspects because both 
investigate the defendant’s actions, instead of the defendant’s market 
                                                                                                             
 126 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 701 (1962). 
Parties may use circumstantial evidence to prove a conspiracy under Sections 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act: the parties must present “sufficient evidence to go to the jury and it is 
the jury which ‘weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences’ and draws ‘the 
ultimate conclusion as to the facts.’” Id. at 700–01 (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. R. 
Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944)). 
 127 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
 128 See id. at 401 (“The charge of the trial court, viewed as a whole, fairly submitted to 
the jury the question whether a price-fixing agreement as described in the first count was 
entered into by the respondents.”). 
 129 See id. (“Whether the prices actually agreed upon were reasonable or unreasonable 
was immaterial in the circumstances charged in the indictment and necessarily found by 
the verdict.”). 
 130 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION (CIVIL CASES) (2005), available at  
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/documents/pdfs/civjury.pdf; see also FIFTH CIRCUIT 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CIVIL (2006) (including sections on per se violation 
§§ 6.1-6.2), available at http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/. 
 131 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION (CIVIL CASES) 278–79 (2005), 
available at  http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/documents/pdfs/civjury.pdf. 
 132 American Bar Association, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL ANTITRUST 
CASES 54–56 (2009). 
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power.133   Additionally, both focus on judicial precedents and theories 
instead of reasonableness of the actions.134  Courts already send per se to 
juries through general and special jury instruction.135  Therefore, courts 
should also submit quick look to the jury – through general or special 
jury instructions – if litigants are worried about the complexity of certain 
issues.136 
B. Rule of Reason and Quick Look Demand the Trier of Facts to Balance 
the Evidence 
The fact that the quick look analysis mirrors per se is not the only 
reason why it must also go to the jury.  Quick look should go to the jury 
because it mirrors the rule of reason in its other aspects.  While cases 
under per se focus on the issue of actions and horizontal agreements, 
cases under rule of reason address less targeted questions and center on 
the issue of reasonableness.  Quick look mirrors rule of reason in the way 
courts require a balancing of the proposed evidence and theories.137  The 
two analyses borrow from each other. 
                                                                                                             
 133 See Cal., ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing how “per se treatment is proper only ‘[o]nce experience with a particular kind 
of restraint enables the [c]ourt to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will 
condemn it’” and how quick look requires “experience of the market . . . [to reach] a 
confident conclusion”) (citation omitted). 
 134 Id. at 1134 (holding that “[f]ull rule of reason treatment is unnecessary where the 
anticompetitive effects are clear even in the absence of a detailed market analysis” and 
hence affirming that a court applies per se and quick look in this situation – focusing on 
the anticompetitive behavior and circumventing the market analysis). 
 135 Courts can approve special interrogatories in order to help the jury focus on the 
proper issues.  See, e.g., ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION (CIVIL CASES), 
supra note 132, at 284–85. 
 136 A group of 118 Law, Economics and Business Professors and the American 
Antitrust Institute filed an amicus brief in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceutical, 133 S.Ct. 787, 
No. 12-416 (filed 23 Jan. 2013) [hereinafter Scholars Brief].  In their brief, these scholars 
argue in favor of reviewing reverse payment under quick look.  They suggest a test that 
focuses on the intent of the settlor and on pro-competitive justifications.  The settlor’s 
intent can be assessed from the size of the payment in comparison to litigation cost.  The 
pro-competitive justifications may take any form like in rule of reason cases.  This 
amicus brief also offers some specific questions that could guide a jury. 
 137 Polygram Holding, Inc., v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The D.C. Circuit 
court accepts the four step analytic framework that FTC employed.  Id. at 35-36. In North 
Texas Specialty Physicians v. Federal Trade Commission, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008), 
the Fifth Circuit fashioned a shorter three-part analysis.  Id. 361–62.  Both quick look 
analyses, however, employed by these circuit courts involved a balancing of evidence and 
theories.  Even in California v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2010), the 
Ninth Circuit discussed a three step process involving weighing of the evidence before 
the case was later reversed en banc because the majority found that quick look was 
inappropriate for this case in California, ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 
1139 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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Sometimes, quick look and rule of reason mirror each other so 
much that trial court applying quick look may move their investigation 
into rule of reason territory.  For instance, in Realcomp II, Ltd, v. FTC,138 
the Sixth Circuit court affirmed, under rule of reason, a Commission’s 
decision made under quick look without requiring further steps. 139  
“[N]otwithstanding its initial quick-look analysis, the Commission 
alternatively invalidated the challenged restraints under a more searching 
inquiry, which included an assessment of Realcomp’s market power and 
the actual, as well as likely, anticompetitive effects of its policies.”140  
The Commission used a more extended quick look analysis, akin to a 
rule of reason analysis.141  In spite of the labeling, the two analyses live 
along a not-well-delimited spectrum.142 
Sometimes, quick look and rule of reason mirror each other so 
much that trial court applying rule of reason rely on tools usually 
reserved for quick look analysis.  For instance, in Todd v. Exxon Corp. et 
al., the Second Circuit affirmed that anticompetitive effects used to 
determine market power are not limited to quick look and used 
anticompetitive effects as an “alternative way[] of demonstrating market 
power.” 143   In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the six major oil 
producers, particularly Exxon, exchanged information regarding 
employees’ compensation in order to use that information to depress 
employee wages and to essentially decrease competition for qualified 
employees, excising their oligopoly power.144  Because the plaintiff’s 
market definition was over-inclusive and under-inclusive,145 the lower 
court determined that the plaintiff failed to prove market power and 
dismissed the case for failure to state a claim.146 The Second Circuit, 
however, reversed and remanded the case,147 determining that the market 
                                                                                                             
 138 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 139 See id. 
 140 Id. at 827. 
 141 See id. 
 142 One problem with quick look being so close to a rule of reason analysis is that the 
litigants have to prepare for a full blown rule of reason case, unless it is very clear what 
kind of evidence will not be needed early on.  This dual trial preparation offers no 
savings for the litigations.  However, parties to a suit will most likely argue which 
analysis applies and hence will often have to prepare regardless for the rule of reason 
analysis.  Therefore, the savings will come from judicial efficiency, and not necessarily 
on trial preparations.  The determination of the case will affect the procedure and the 
burdens of proof during the trials. 
 143 Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 207 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 144 Id. at 196–97. 
 145 Id. at 201. 
 146 Id. at 206. 
 147 Id. at 214–15. 
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definition is plausible.148  In its analysis, the Second Circuit court denied 
that the district court applied quick look when this lower court used 
anticompetitive effects to assess market power.149  The circuit noted that 
using anticompetitive effects to assess market power “is not limited to 
‘quick look’ or ‘truncated’ rule of reason cases.”150 
Finally, quick look mirrors rule of reason in some respects but rule 
of reason borrows some of quick look tools as well.  Trial courts affirm 
that rule of reason and the reasonableness of restraints both remain 
questions of fact.151  Therefore, quick look should be a question of fact as 
well. 
C. Parties’ Jury Preferences Should Not Dictate the Mode of Analysis 
In the past, the trial court decided whether to call a case per se or 
rule of reason.  Once it made that decision, the case went to the jury after 
arguments to determine whether the plaintiff had satisfied his burden of 
proof and showed all the elements of per se offenses (e.g. collusion) or 
the unreasonableness of a restraint under rule of reason. 
Today, on the other hand, a trial court decides whether per se, quick 
look or rule of reason applies. Only per se and rule of reason, however, 
go to the jury.  Quick look cases should go to the jury because, in and of 
itself, quick look is not a new mode of analysis since it borrows from 
both the per se and rule of reason analyses, both of which already go to 
the jury. 
Additionally, quick look cases should go to the jury because they 
live on the same spectrum as per se and rule of reason cases.  Since all 
the other elements of this spectrum go to the jury, the logical conclusion 
is that so should quick look cases.152  Furthermore, quick look should go 
to the jury because judicial consistency dictates that it should.  If the 
Supreme Court wanted to carve out an exception for the non-
involvement of juries with quick look, it would carve out an explicit 
exception; in the absence of such instruction, quick look cases should 
remain uniform with the other to modes of analysis, and thus go to the 
jury. 
                                                                                                             
 148 Id. at 207. 
 149 Todd, 275 F.3d at 206–07. 
 150 Id. at 207. 
 151 See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“[R]easonableness  is  a question  of fact . . . .”); Winn Ave. Warehouse, Inc. v. 
Winchester Tobacco Warehouse Co., 341 F.2d 287, 287  (6th  Cir.  1965) (“Whether a 
restraint is unreasonable or whether there is any restraint  is a question of fact.”). 
 152 Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 831 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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Defendants will always argue for an analysis that allows them to 
present more elements.  They will argue that per se cases should be 
analyzed under quick look or rule of reason; they will argue that quick 
look should be analyzed under rule of reason.  Yet, a hypothetical case 
may present itself where a defendant will request quick look instead of 
the rule of reason because he wants to avoid a jury and even if it faces 
more unfavorable presumptions under the quick look.  Under the current 
rule, a defendant can defeat the plaintiff’s request for a jury trial merely 
by arguing that the case ought to be analyzed under quick look instead of 
per se. 
Similarly, plaintiffs will always argue for an analysis that creates 
more presumptions against the defendant.  Plaintiffs will argue that rule 
of reason cases should be analyzed under quick look or even per se; they 
will argue that quick look cases should be analyzed under per se.  Yet, a 
plaintiff may request the rule of reason to assure that he gets a jury even 
if quick look applies and offers more favorable presumptions because the 
current rule inconsistently discourages them from requesting a quick 
look analysis since the plaintiffs must give up their right to a jury trial.  
To prevent these inconsistencies, quick look cases should go to the jury. 
D. Quick Look Creates Presumptions and Shifts the Burden of Proof 
This section discusses how quick look is not merely a mode of 
analysis, but also a different burden of proof that creates different 
presumptions.153  When a court decides to investigate under quick look, 
the court not only decides the type of information to investigate but also 
puts different burdens of proof on the plaintiff and the defendant. 
The selection between the modes of analysis has been equated with 
establishing the burden of proof, the presumptions to instruct the jury, 
and the admissibility of evidence.154  Quick look analysis has its own 
                                                                                                             
 153 For instance in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), the Supreme Court 
refused to “hold that reverse payment settlement agreements are presumptively unlawful 
and that courts reviewing such agreements should proceed via a ‘quick look’ approach, 
rather than applying a ‘rule of reason’” because the anticompetitive effects of reverse 
payments depend on a number of factors such as the size of the payment and the litigation 
costs.  Id. at 2237.  Lower courts should consider anticompetitive arguments, as well as 
pro-competitive or competition-neutral arguments. 
 154 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779–80 (1999) (explaining that the 
“quality of the proof required should vary with the circumstances;” that “naked 
restraint[s] on price and output need not be supported by a detailed market analysis in 
order to” move to the second step of the quick look analysis and “require” defendants to 
produce “some competitive justification;” and that not “every case attacking a less 
obviously anticompetitive restraint . . . is a candidate for plenary market examination”). 
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presumptions155 and admissibility issues: courts have interpreted quick 
look as a process of weighing of evidence. 
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the restraint is 
theoretically or actually anticompetitive.156  If the plaintiff fails to carry 
this burden, the court will dismiss the complaint.157  Nothing indicates, 
however, that a jury is unable to make the same findings.158   On the 
other hand, if the plaintiff satisfies this burden of proof, then the burden 
shifts to the defendant to show that the restraint has pro-competitive or 
competition-neutral effects.  At this point, the defendant may bring in 
empirical evidence but may also argue within the theoretical framework, 
as the defendant attempted in North Texas Specialty Physicians v. 
FTC.159  If the defendant fails, the court can rule in the plaintiff’s favor.  
If the defendant shows pro-competitive or competition-neutral effects, 
however, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who has one last chance 
to introduce evidence.  The court must then balance the evidence.  This 
balancing is not new to juries.  They already perform this balancing for 
the rule of reason analysis and they already balance facts in every civil 
case, regardless of the subject matter, when deciding whether to believe 
particular witnesses or evidence provided by plaintiffs or the defendants. 
While the concept may not be new, some may argue that the topic 
might be more “complicated.” 160   But, recall that quick look only 
                                                                                                             
 155 Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (“Quick-look analysis in effect” shifts to “a 
defendant the burden to show empirical evidence of procompetitive effects.”) (citing Cal. 
Dental Ass’n, 526 U. S., at 775 n.12)). 
 156 Polygram Holding, Inc., et al. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 157 See, e.g., Viazis v. American Ass’n of Orthodontists, 314 F.3d 758, 766–67 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (affirming summary judgment, finding that, even under the quick look 
analysis, the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof and “to present data 
demonstrating the anticompetitive effects of the advertising restrictions of which he 
complains”). 
 158 Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve 
Years, VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) 
(arguing that since his previous article on the topic entitled Civil Juries and Complex 
Cases: Let’s Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICHIGAN L. REV. 68 (1981) little or no evidence 
has emerged suggesting that “judges can cope with complex issues that juries cannot 
master”—including antitrust cases). 
 159 N. Texas Specialty Physicians v. F.T.C., 528 F.3d 346, 368–69 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(finding that the defendants offered “some evidence in the record of spillover effects 
from the risk contract to non-risk panels, and [some] evidence that NTSP physicians 
perform as well or better than non-NTSP groups”); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 101–106. 
 160 See, e.g., Thomas M. Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial of 
Antitrust Issues, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1981) (arguing that antitrust economic questions are 
too complicated for juries and should be left to judges—while juries should only address 
questions of conduct and damages); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and 
Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797, 813 (1987) (“[T]he Court also 
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requires a rudimentary understanding of economics—unlike the rule of 
reason analysis, which involves practices requiring more than a 
rudimentary understanding of economics and demands juries to 
determine reasonableness of complicated business practices. 
Both the per se rule and rule of reason analyses leave a number of 
complicated questions for the jury. 161   Both have been submitted to 
juries.  As a result, there is no reason why quick look should not be 
submitted to juries as well.  Courts’ fears that quick look cases are more 
complicated than per se or rule of reason cases can easily be diffused by 
adequate guidance from the judge and jury instructions, spelling out what 
must be proven under the quick look test.   If properly instructed, the jury 
will decide properly. 
E. Scholastic Interpretation of Quick Look 
Scholars are split on their interpretations of quick look: some argue 
that quick look is a shorter version of rule of reason;162 others argue that 
quick look is an analytic procedure. 163   However, these two 
interpretations are sometimes nothing more than subtle semantic 
differences. 
First, detractors of quick look interpret the rule as a poor-man’s rule 
of reason in which shortcuts lead to costly judicial mistakes.  For 
                                                                                                             
has limited the right to jury trial by stating that it hinges, among other things, on ‘the 
practical abilities and limitations of juries.’ While the Court offered this test with 
reference to issues, not entire cases, several lower courts have denied jury trials in 
antitrust cases of great complexity.”) (internal citations omitted).  See infra Part III 
(arguing that Patent questions already go to the jury and often require more complicated 
engineering questions than rudimentary economic questions). 
 161 In Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, Justice Brandeis identified 
the following factors that a judge or jury must consider when determining 
reasonableness: 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates, and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or even 
destroy competition. To determine that question, the court must ordinarily consider the 
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied, its condition before and 
after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the restraint, and its effect, actual or 
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting 
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. 
246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918). 
 162 Catherine Verschelden, Is the Quick-Look Antitrust Analysis in PolyGram Holding 
Inherently Suspect?, 32 J. OF CORP. L. 447, 452 (2007). 
 163 See Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830–31 (3d Cir. 
2010) (explaining that quick look is a three step process); Crane, supra note 38, at 63 
(explaining that “[a]lthough a reticulated burden-shifting framework remains in place, it 
is procedural and flexible rather than substantive and rigid”). 
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instance, Judge Frank Easterbrook 164  argues that because of these 
shortcuts to the rule of reason, judges will condemn new practices that 
they do not at first understand because of their lack of experience and 
expertise.165  Judge Easterbrook asserts that if defendants do not have 
market power, their harmful practices will be unsuccessful and the 
market will correct this harm, which makes judicial intervention 
pointless.166  Other scholars argue that market power remains important 
because market power is dispositive of intent.167  In short, market power 
and even consumer harm168 act as a filter for cases, but not for bad 
behavior. 
Some scholars, however, have advocated that quick look should be 
applied in a sequential way, adapting as each case develops.169  If the 
cost of gathering information on efficiency of horizontal behaviors is 
lower than the cost of gathering information on market power, then the 
analysis should start with the efficiency of horizontal behaviors.170  This 
first step of the analysis will act as a gatekeeper for cases and the court 
can stop its analysis if the plaintiff does not successfully carry his burden 
of proof on each balancing question.171 
Of recent times, the Court has encouraged judicial efficiencies by 
giving a more important gatekeeping role to courts.  In Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly,172 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must allege 
enough specific facts when stating a claim in order to avoid a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.173  
Therefore, the Supreme Court encourages lower courts to filter cases 
                                                                                                             
 164 Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
983 (1987). 
 165 Id. at 986–87. 
 166 Id. at 989. 
 167 C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 
67 ANTITRUST L. J. 41, 48 (1999). 
 168 Meese, supra note 38, at 479–80 (arguing that quick look is a step in the wrong 
direction and that courts should apply the merger guideline to anticompetitive behavior 
because, without a thorough investigation, the court shifts the burden of proof without 
meaningful proof of consumer harm and anticompetitive effects). 
 169 Beckner, supra note 169, at 68–70. 
 170 Id. at 69. 
 171 Id. at 70. 
 172 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 173 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court removed the doubts that this 
gatekeeping duty was limited to antitrust cases.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell 
Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 
25 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 61, 64 (2007) (“As matters now stand, it looks as though the 
decision has made a general transformation in pleading rules in all cases, not just within 
the antitrust area, although only the future will show for sure.”). 
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better; it should encourage these courts to apply quick look to further 
filter cases: if a plaintiff cannot win under quick look, he will not 
succeed under rule of reason. 
However, these two gatekeeping tools differ.  If the Court wanted 
only judges to apply quick look, it need not have created a new mode of 
analysis because such a tool already exist in the form of summary 
judgment.  The Supreme Court wanted courts to have two tools and it 
should encourage the use of both.  Courts can benefit from this 
encouragement because, with practice, lower courts will understand 
quick look better and will be able to direct juries better. 
Second, supporters of quick look argue that quick look, as a 
procedural tool, offers the flexibility that courts have already enjoyed 
with per se but yet should not exist: after a trial court chooses which 
analysis to apply and reviews the facts of the case, it may not be satisfied 
with its choice and extend its analysis beyond the traditional analysis 
boundaries—and reach a rule of reason analysis.174  The Supreme Court 
essentially applied this logic in the per se analysis in NCAA and BMI, 
where the Court began by applying a per se analysis and, when it became 
more familiar with the facts, let in pro-competitive justifications. 
Like any analysis, quick look offers some pros (e.g. judicial 
efficiencies much like per se) and cons (e.g. higher rate of false positives 
than rule of reason).  Courts should not, however, treat quick look like 
the unwanted middle-child: courts should apply quick look more often, 
potentially in that gatekeeping role.  Courts should not prevent juries 
from reviewing quick look merely because the courts, themselves, do not 
understand this analysis as well as the other two.  Instead, courts should 
direct the quick look analysis inquiry better. 
Third, quick look advocates interpret the rule as a structured rule of 
reason for inherently anticompetitive behaviors.  Because quick look 
applies to inherently anticompetitive behavior, some scholars point to 
specific scenarios in which quick look should prevail over per se and rule 
of reason analysis.  For instance, a large number of legal and economic 
scholars as well as the American Antitrust Institute encourage the use of 
quick look in courts’ review of reverse payment settlement.175  They 
                                                                                                             
 174 Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 832 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Although competitive harm is initially presumed under ‘quick look,’ ‘[i]f the defendant 
offers sound procompetitive justifications . . . the court must proceed to weigh the overall 
reasonableness of the restraint using a full-scale rule of reason analysis.’”) (quoting U.S. 
v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir.1993)); see also Crane, supra note 38, at 63 
(explaining that quick look “is procedural and flexible rather than substantive and rigid”). 
 175 Scholars Brief, supra note 138, at 30–35. 
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argue that the rule of reason is not appropriate because reverse payment 
have only anticompetitive effects and no pro-competitive effects.176  In 
this group’s view, quick look is appropriate because it creates a 
rebuttable presumption of illegality.177 
Some quick look advocates argue that standard setting is another 
area in which quick look could be useful.178  Since standard setting has 
great benefits – such as network effects179—but also great drawbacks—
such as lock-in effects180—standard setting lends itself to quick look and 
its balancing.181  Standard-setting consortia should hold the presumption 
of validity because standard setting offers such large benefits.182 
IV. IMPLICATION OF THE “OBSERVER STANDARD” 
The Supreme Court determined that quick look is appropriate only 
where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics 
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an 
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”183  When defining its 
observer standard, the Court did not specify a judge with rudimentary 
understanding of economics (or the FTC) but an observer with a 
rudimentary understanding of economics.184   Thus, it would be improper 
to assume the Court intended to restrict quick look to judges or the FTC 
because if the Court wanted such restriction, it could have simply written 
so.  This section addresses the economics-educated observer standard 
that the Supreme Court defined in California Dental Association.  
Although courts have expressed that the economics-educated observer 
standard is too high a standard to meet, I argue that this heightened 
standard may not be as high as first thought. 
                                                                                                             
 176 Id. at 32. 
 177 Id. at 34 (arguing that the  “[t]he presumption in K-Dur ‘could be rebutted by 
showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers 
some pro-competitive benefit’”) (citing In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F. 3d 197, 
218 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
 178 Douglas D. Leeds, Raising the Standard: Antitrust Scrutiny of Standard-Setting 
Consortia in High Technology Industries, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
641 (1997). 
 179 Id. at 646–47. 
 180 Id. at 650. 
 181 Id. at 669–70. 
 182 Leeds argues that reviews impose delay that can hamper innovation.  Id. at 665.  If 
the purpose of antitrust review is to promote innovation and the best standards, quick 
look creates a presumption hard to overcome. Id. at 669. 
 183 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 184 Id.; see also NCAA, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Nat’l Soc’y Of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 
679, 692 (1978). 
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While the Court did not explicitly address whether quick look cases 
should go to the jury, it provided enough context to assert that it should.  
The Court used the term “observer” in two separate occasions; the 
Establishment Clause context and Patent law context. 
A. Establishment Clause and the Reasonable Observer Standard 
The Supreme Court first introduced the objective or reasonable 
observer in Lynch v. Donnelly185 and this observer standard “gradually 
became a part of the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine as a means 
for evaluating the constitutionality of a government action’s effect.”186  
Lynch called for the “[e]xamination of both the subjective and the 
objective components of the message communicated by a government 
action . . . to determine whether the action carries a forbidden 
meaning.”187 
Thus, the Court called upon the values of a reasonable person to 
resolve two questions: (1) whether a reasonable observer would perceive 
the challenged action as a governmental action;188 and (2) whether the 
challenged action is an endorsement of religion.189  The Court interpreted 
the first question, whether the challenged action amounted to a 
governmental action, as a question of fact.190  Recently, the Court has 
reiterated this interpretation in Salazar v. Buono, 191  in which it 
acknowledged that the reasonable observer standard is a fact-sensitive 
inquiry.192  Yet, the Court interpreted the second question, whether the 
challenged action amounts to an endorsement of religion, as a question of 
law.193 
Lower courts are left wondering:194 they must call upon the average 
consciousness because “reasonable observer” has also been equated to 
                                                                                                             
 185 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 186 Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer’s 
Eyes: The Evolution-Intelligent Design Debates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 445 
(2006) (internal quotation omitted). 
 187 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 188 Id.; see also Joki v. Board of Educ. of Schuylerville Central Sch. Dist., 745 F. 
Supp. 823, 827, 829 (N.D. N.Y. 1990). 
 189 Bowman, supra note 188, at 485. 
 190 Id. 
 191 559 U.S. 700 (2010). 
 192 Id. at 721 (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005)); Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992). 
 193 Bowman, supra note 188, at 485.  See Lynch 465 U.S. at 694 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he question is . . . in large part a legal question to be answered on the 
basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.”). 
 194 Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. American Atheists, 132 S. Ct. 12, 19–20 (2011) 
(The Court rejected the petition for certiorari, writing that “[o]ne might be forgiven for 
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the “average observer” but fail to find a consistent standard.195  It seems 
almost natural that a jury of our peers would be more adept to express 
this average opinion than a bench of well-educated judges.  That is why, 
unsurprisingly, the reasonable observer standard has evolved into a 
mixed question of law and fact196 and with Salazar, seems to moving 
closer to a question of fact.197 
The leap from one observer to the next seems easy. The reasonable 
observer standard, however, can arguably be distinguished from the 
economics-educated standard because a juror does not require any 
outside knowledge to apply the reasonable observer standard.  The same 
cannot be said about the explicitly termed economics-educated standard.  
This outside knowledge distinction has little hold because the Court has 
allowed information to be introduced at trial even with reasonable 
observer standards:198  the Court softens its hold upon the reasonable 
observer because the Court believes that the “endorsement test 
necessarily focuses upon the perception of a reasonable, informed 
observer.” 199   Thus, the reasonable observer must either already be 
informed or must receive some information or evidence during the trial.  
The observer with rudimentary understanding of economics could be put 
in the same category. 
                                                                                                             
failing to discern a workable principle that explains . . . wildly divergent outcomes [of 
previous cases].  Such arbitrariness is the product of an Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence that does nothing to constrain judicial discretion, but instead asks, based on 
terms like ‘context’ and ‘message,’ whether a hypothetical reasonable observer of a 
religious display could think that the government has made a law ‘respecting an 
establishment of religion.’  Whether a given court’s hypothetical observer will be ‘any 
beholder (no matter how unknowledgeable), or the average beholder, or . . . the ‘ultra-
reasonable’ beholder,’ is entirely unpredictable.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 195 Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1491 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990) (finding issue of material fact regarding how average 
observer would interpret city logo). 
 196 See Christian M. Keiner, Preaching from the State’s Podium: What Speech is 
Proselytizing Prohibited by the Establishment Clause?, 21 BYU J. Pub. L. 83, 84 (2007) 
(“Most recently, in the 2005 term Ten Commandments cases, ‘proselytizing’ appeared to 
evolve into a question of fact, or mixed question of law and fact, rather than a conclusion 
of law.”). 
 197 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 798 n.3 
(1995); McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 
US 677 (2005). 
 198 Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, NM, 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(“The objective or reasonable observer is kin to the fictitious ‘reasonably prudent person’ 
of tort law.  So we presume that the court-created ‘objective observer’ is aware of 
information ‘not limited to ‘the information gleaned simply from viewing the challenged 
display.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 199 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 773 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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As the Court continues to refine this reasonable observer standard, 
the Justices will move toward making the question of a “reasonable 
observer” more and more a question of fact instead of a question of law. 
The Court has established this reasonable observer standard as a 
question of fact for more than a century.  The quick look observer 
standard need not go through the same slow process as the reasonable 
observer standard.  This new standard should benefit from the Court’s 
experience with the reasonable observer standard and with the ordinary 
observer standard discussed next. 
B. Patent Litigation and the Ordinary Observer 
The Supreme Court uses an “ordinary observer” standard in the 
intellectual property context. 200   The Court established this ordinary 
observer test in Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. White:201 
If, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a 
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if 
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing 
him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one 
patented is infringed by the other.202 
In the same opinion, the Court rejected an “expert” standard.203  
Thus, an ordinary observer of the two products has to decide whether the 
products are similar enough to risk deception. 
Considering this ordinary observer standard, the Court later 
affirmed that the question of infringement “might present a question of 
fact for a court or jury.”204  Of course, different circuit courts have had to 
refine the ordinary observer standard over the years 205  and these 
refinements led to two different tests: “the copying/unlawful 
appropriation test associated with the Second Circuit [and] the 
extrinsic/intrinsic test associated with the Ninth Circuit.” 206   The 
distinction between the two is not germane to this paper. 
                                                                                                             
 200 See, e.g., Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 467 (1893); Howe Scale Co. 
v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118, 140 (1905). 
 201 81 U.S. 511 (1871). 
 202 Id. at 528. 
 203 Id. at 527. 
 204 See Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U.S. 403, 441 (1902). 
 205 Robert C. Osterberg and Eric C. Osterberg, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW, § 3 (2012). 
 206 Id. at § 3–2. 
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As technology becomes more complex, however, some questions 
will naturally become more difficult than others.207  Courts must decide 
whether to admit expert testimony to educate the jury.208  Depending on 
the test, some experts have been allowed to weigh-in and educate the 
trier of facts on the similarities between the products.209  Of course, the 
courts only allow the trier of fact to make the final decision on the 
question of infringement.210 
The general “ordinary observer test” differs from the copyright 
infringement subtests because “expert testimony generally [is] not 
considered in connection with the ordinary observer test.”211  Courts do 
limit what experts may do: the experts cannot tell a jury whether two 
products are similar; however, the experts may educate a jury on some 
subtests and the function of each element of the product.212 
This distinction between telling a jury that two items are similar 
and describing to a jury a selection of functions of two separate products 
seems almost fictional and has led some to call for the end of this 
artificial subtle distinction.213  As technology and computer programs 
become more and more predominant on the copyright infringement 
scene, juries are going to need experts.  Courts have already made 
                                                                                                             
 207 Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232–33 (3d Cir. 
1986) (holding that the ordinary observer test should not be applied in cases where the 
subjects of copyright are particularly complex, such as computer programs). 
 208 See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (allowing expert 
testimony under the substantial similarly test); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattell, Inc., 518 F.3d 
628, 637 (9th Cir. 2008) (drawing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic test, 
where the former test allows expert, while the latter does not). 
 209 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 939 (1991) (discussing the differences between the 
substantial similarity test, intrinsic test, and the involvement of expert testimony with 
each test). 
 210 See, e.g., Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
 211 Osterberg, supra note 207, at 3-5. 
 212 See, e.g., Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co. v. Lasko Metal Prods., 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13491, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2001) (“The Federal Circuit has recognized that 
expert testimony and testimony by a defendant’s employee are proper evidence upon 
which a jury could rely in deciding that a design patent has been infringed.”). 
 213 See Graham Ballou, Substantial Disparity: Copyright Chaos in the Second Circuit,  
2 N.Y.U. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. LEDGER 45 (2011) (“Expert testimony on substantial 
similarity would, at the least, clear judicial fog at this stage of a copyright infringement 
analysis: courts could abandon the fiction of an objective, ‘ordinary observer’ perspective 
– the controlling test for substantial similarity – and allow specialists to conduct what is 
in fact a highly technical analysis.”). 
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exceptions, 214  and more will come until the superfluous distinction 
fades.215 
In many respects, the ordinary observer standard may best represent 
the way in which lower courts should interpret the economics-educated 
standard because of their similarities and the potential for complicated 
questions.  These complicated questions must involve experts in the 
same way: courts must use experts to educate the jury. 
C. The Role of Expert Witnesses 
The ordinary and reasonable observers are legal fictions, much like 
the reasonable person in tort law.216  The observer with a rudimentary 
understanding of economics is likely to be a legal fiction as well: the 
average juror will have little understanding of economics, whereas the 
average expert will have more than a rudimentary understanding.  Who 
are those observers with rudimentary understanding of economics? 
Because courts have allowed quick look analysis only for cases 
brought and administered by the FTC, the FTC is the obvious answer.  I 
would argue, however, that all Commissioners have more than a 
rudimentary understanding of economics.  More importantly, Justice 
Stevens could have as easily limited quick look analysis to FTC reviews.  
But he did not.  Therefore, in the absence of such language, the Court 
must have intended to include other individuals in the category of 
economics-educated observers. 
Because a number of judges receive some economics education 
during various continuing legal education programs, the Supreme Court 
may arguably have extended this new observer standard to judges.217  
These programs are usually short, a few days at most.  Courts could 
encourage parties to educate juries through experts in the same ways 
                                                                                                             
 214 See, e.g., Marta Kowalczyk, Design Patent Infringement: Post-Egyptian Goddess, 
2010 U. ILL. J.L., TECH. & POL’Y 239 (2010) (discussing the use of expert in patent 
infringement litigation). 
 215 See, e.g., Christopher V. Carani, The New “Extra-Ordinary” Observer Test for 
Design Patent Infringement—On a Crash Course With the Supreme Court’s Precedent in 
Gorham v. White, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 354 (2009). 
 216 See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 
2009) (“[T]he ‘ordinary observer,’ like the ‘reasonable person’ in tort law, is a legal 
fiction; it is the measure by which the trier of fact judges the similarity of two works.”); 
Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, NM, 541 F. 3d 1017, 1031 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The 
objective or reasonable observer is kin to the fictitious ‘reasonably prudent person’ of tort 
law.”). 
 217 See, e.g., ABA Section of Antitrust Law and George Mason Judicial Education 
Program, Antitrust Law & Economics Institute for Judges at the George Mason 
University School of Law & Economics Center (Oct. 2011). 
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during trials; alternatively, the court could pick the expert in order to 
have a more neutral education. 
The education of judges has had important impacts upon antitrust 
cases.  According to one empirical study, the education of judges affects 
the outcome of cases and appeal rates. 218   This study used data on 
antitrust cases brought between 1996 and 2006, and included information 
on the training and experience of the judge, the judge’s political 
affiliation, whether an appeal was filed, and circuit in which it was 
filed.219  The researchers found that a judge’s basic economic training has 
a negative and statistically significant effect upon the probability of a 
plaintiff filing appeal for simple cases.220  This education, however, has 
no statistically significant effect on complicated cases. 221   Thus, 
educating juries can have potentially the same impact in giving them 
rudimentary economics and can help with simple cases. 
Most of the jury’s education will come from experts.  However, 
because this study classifies a case as simple or complex if judge’s 
opinion includes terms like “expert witness,” “expert report,” and 
“economic expert”,222 then the presence of an expert renders the case 
automatically complicated.  Therefore, this study does not allow one to 
determine whether experts affect a court’s appeal rate.  As a result, this 
study cannot be relied upon to determine whether an expert can educate a 
court in a case that only requires a rudimentary understanding of 
economics and it does not clarify whether a court (or a jury) can be 
educated during the course of a case. 
What are we to draw from this analysis?  I would argue that juries 
can easily gain a rudimentary understanding of economics: if juries have 
been educated about engineering issues and similarities between product 
functions, then they could be educated in economic issues and 
similarities between business practices; 223  if judges benefit from a 
                                                                                                             
 218 Joshua Wright & Michael Baye, The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial 
Training on Appeals, 54 J.L. & ECON. 1, 13 (2011). 
 219 Id. at 6. 
 220 The study uses a probit with the probability of having a decision appealed as the 
dependent variable and the training of the judge as the independent variable. Id. at 14. 
 221 Id. at 15. 
 222 Id. at 7. 
 223 Crane, supra note 38, at 92–94 (arguing that juries are ill-equipped to deal with 
antitrust issues and judges are better equipped to deal with contested economic theories 
presented by experts).  Nonetheless, I would first argue that if per se or the rule of reason 
analyses go to the jury, then all three analyses ought to go to the jury for consistency (see 
infra) and second if juries can decided the resemblances between complicated patents, 
they ought to be able to understand economics issues, with which they are likely to have 
more daily experience.  Irrelevantly, judges act as gatekeepers of experts under Daubert 
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summary economics education, then juries will likely also benefit or at 
least will pick up enough understanding of economics to qualify as a 
rudimentary economics education.224 
Furthermore, courts have submitted previous observer standards to 
the jury. 225   All these standards have emanated from common law 
interpretations of the Constitution.  Congress wrote the Sherman Act in 
vague terms to allow for common law interpretation and with common 
law in mind. 226   Therefore, courts ought to similarly treat all these 
common law observer standards: this new observer standard ought to be 
no different in spite of what the Third Circuit has expressed in dictum.  
Courts must submit quick look cases to the jury. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Some commentators speak of quick look as modified per se, while 
others interpret quick look as truncated rule of reason. In practice, it 
could probably be either, but is there a better way to think of it?  As 
Beckner and Salop argue, quick look may be the analysis that meets the 
case.227   This adaptive approach, however, could minimize the role of 
per se by shifting all per se cases toward quick look: courts should retain 
some division between the analyses to take advantage of the judicial 
efficiencies; yet, courts should not be timid and unwilling to look at more 
evidence when the situation warrants it. 
The Supreme Court may have to weigh in on the issue at some 
point.  Clues left in its previous opinions, however, point to the 
conclusion that quick look ought to go to the jury.  First, per se, quick 
look, and rule of reason live along a continuum of analyses.  Since per se 
                                                                                                             
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and can assure that the experts are 
qualified to educate the jury. 
 224 See generally John M. Majoras, You Too Can Win Antitrust Cases: The Myths and 
Realities of Trying an Antitrust Case to a Jury, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2 (2009) (“Most 
jurors are unable to spout economic theory, but they intuitively understand many of the 
fundamentals of economic theory from everyday experiences.”), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Jun09_Majoras6_29f
.authcheckdam.pdf 
 225 See Section IV A. & B. supra. 
 226 William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the 
“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1982) (“The 
antitrust laws were written with awareness of the diversity of business conduct and with 
the knowledge that the detailed statutes which would prohibit socially undesirable 
conduct would lack the flexibility needed to encourage (and at times even permit) 
desirable conduct. To provide this flexibility, Congress adopted what is in essence 
enabling legislation that has permitted a common-law refinement of antitrust law through 
an evolution guided by only the most general statutory directions.”). 
 227 Beckner, supra note 169, at 70. 
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and rule of reason can go to the jury, so should quick look.  More simply 
put, courts determine whether a business practice falls under a certain 
analysis according to precedents and effects; courts do not classify 
practices as falling under a certain analysis according to the difficulty of 
the economics involved. 
Before any behavior may fall under quick look, courts must have 
previously analyzed it under the rule of reason (and possibly per se) 
analysis.  Thus, these practices, which had been previously put to the 
jury, should remain with the jury even if courts gained experience in 
dealing with them because juries have already determined reasonableness 
in the past. 
Second, previous common law interpretations of the Constitution 
have bred observer standards that have gone to the jury.  Courts must 
treat this new standard in the same way.  The topic in antitrust case is 
economics, which is not more complicated than computer programs in 
patent cases.  Furthermore, quick look’s standard only requires a 
“rudimentary understanding” of economics, which ought to be attainable 
thanks to expert testimonies. 
While jury trials are rare,228 the possibility of a jury trial has a deep 
influence upon the strategic decision to settle 229  or even to ex-ante 
engage in any possibly anticompetitive behavior.230  Yet, with all their 
faults, juries are part of the American civil judicial system and are here to 
stay.  Thus, the question is when should you use juries?  The simple 
answer is that juries should be used in a consistent manner. 
In its haste, the Third Circuit may have looked to the wrong source 
to determine whether quick look goes to the jury and the ABA may want 
to take a closer look at their model jury instructions.231  Although other 
circuits have not yet weighed in on the issue, they must act with more 
careful deliberation than the Third Circuit, by following the clear clues 
left by the Supreme Court.232 
                                                                                                             
 228 Crane, supra note 38, at 78–79 notes that only nine antitrust cases out of 818 were 
tried by juries in 2005, less than 1% of the cases filed. 
 229 Id. at 92 (arguing that letting antitrust questions juries go to the jury has its own 
issues because of their inherent bias against large corporation). 
 230 Id. at 99. 
 231 The AAI has announced that it is looking at civil antitrust jury instructions and will 
be release their own model jury instructions in order to address some of the biases of 
previous model jury instruction such as the embedded biases in the language used.  
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/925CLE_0.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 
2014). 
 232 The Third Circuit’s analysis has already been discussed in articles and should be 
rectified. See e.g. Ryan M. Rodenberg & Daniel Hauptman, American Needle’s Progeny? 
Tennis and Antitrust, 2 PACE. I.P. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 103, 114 (2012). 
